Municipal real property, including commune real estate usually managed through a model of a direct or indirect commissioning system, is becoming increasingly popular, especially in the context of the public management paradigm. The aim of the article is to present the essence of the commissioning system of commune real estate management and indicate the supervisory consequences which rest on the commune as a result of choosing this system. In order to fulfill the assumed research objectives, the article analyzes the commissioning system of commune real estate management in Poland with the use of the agency theory, a dominant theoretical concept of corporate governance.
Introduction
We deal with a commissioning system of real estate management when the management functions are performed by a professional manager chosen by the owner of the real estate, who acts as a natural or legal person. In the case of communes, the delegation takes place according to the provisions of the Public Procurement Act, and most often, the administrator is selected in open tender proceedings. In this model, the commune formulates the management policy and organizes services, while a private entity provides them. Thus, a principal-agent (representation) relationship arises, as we have at least two entities where one, the agent, represents or acts on behalf of the other (the principal).
The aim of the article is to present the essence of the commissioning system of commune real estate management and indicate the supervisory consequences which rest on the commune as a result of choosing such a system. In order to fulfill the assumed research objectives, the article analyzes the commissioning system of commune real estate management in Poland with the use of the agency theory.
Agency theory
The agency theory constitutes a dominant theoretical concept of corporate governance, which, despite several dozen years of functioning, is still an object of studies and analyses of scientists all over the world (GRUSZECKI, 2002) . As KULTYS (2005) writes, "the agency problem appears when actions of one of the parties, e.g., the manager (the agent in the "principal -agent" relation), may have a negative influence on the owner, the source of which may be hidden, unobservable manager's actions or the information possessed by him, inaccessible to the owner." It is assumed that the "principal-agent" notion was introduced by S.A. ROSS (1973) , however, this problem was the object of research and www.versita.com/remv vol. 21, no. 3, 2013 analyses much earlier (BERLE, MEANS, 1932) . According to S.A. Ross, the relation of agency (representation) occurs in a situation when we have at least two entities, and the first one, being the representative (agent), represents or acts on behalf of the other subject (the principal). It is worth emphasizing that, initially, the agency and representation problem was used to describe and study the relationship between an enterprise owner and its management staff (that is the essence of ownership supervision), whereas now the relation is also used to analyze the links among all the stakeholders of an organization (the problem of corporate governance) (MESJASZ, 2002) .
Two basic problems being the object of analysis appear upon the formation of an agency relation. The first one arises in a situation when the goals and endeavors of the principal and agent are in conflict, and when, because of the costs, the principal cannot check whether the agent is behaving properly. Another important element therefore appears, namely the agency costs. And here comes the obvious reference to the theory of transaction costs, the theory presented and propagated in the 1930's by R. Coase (1937) who introduced an assumption that "only in the perfect world the transaction costs are equal to zero, in the real world there are always certain costs of gathering information, negotiating contracts, establishing their final, binding contents, and finally their enforcement" (GRUSZECKI, 2002) . In contemporary times, the transaction cost theory (or in other words, transactional cost theory), constituting the basic building material of new institutional economics, is gaining popularity, mainly owing to O.E. Williamson, one of the two 1 2009 Nobel laureates in the field of economics. It is worth mentioning that, in accordance with the Nobel prizewinner's assumptions, the described agency concept, apart from transaction costs, is a basic building material for the new institutional economics (and, to be more exact, the so-called "effectiveness" stream) (Williamson, 1985) . In the case of the agency theory, costs result from the assumption that both the agent and the principal strive to maximize their utility at the same time, but the agent's interest does not have to be identical with the principal's interest. "In practice, the management staff's actions, such as purchasing expensive equipment, using luxurious hotels, and avoiding certain actions or staying in place in spite of the lack of competencies are indicated" (ALUCHNA, 2002) . Another factor involving agency costs is the inability to draw up a complete contract (HART, MOORE, 1988) since it is not feasible to foresee all the possible scenarios that may arise in the future. That is why, in practice, an incomplete contract arises between the agent and the principal 2 . Moreover, as PESZKO (2006) writes, "if the contract provisions include an ambiguity, each of the contractors will try to use it to its own benefit" due to opportunism which is characteristic for the parties of a contract.
In spite of this, the agency theory looks for "the most beneficial structure of the contract," it tries to link elements concerning the process of realization with elements concerning the results, thus, it tries to answer the following types of questions: "Regular remuneration depending on the realization of the function, or remuneration based on the corporation's results?" and "If the share value determines the shareholder's wealth, why not remunerate the management staff in the form of share options (working with increasing their own wealth in mind, they will work to increase the shareholder's wealth at the same time) (LIS, STERNICZUK, 2005) ?"
The second problem being the subject of analysis when describing the agency theory is the problem of risk division in a situation when the agent and the ordering party have a different attitude to a specific action due to a different preference of risk (EISENHARDT, 1989) . The starting point is the assumption according to which the agent displays a neutral position, or even aversion to risk (due to limited possibilities of employment diversification), whereas the principal takes on a neutral position (due to the possibility of diversifying his investment in various ventures (KOZINA, 2004) . Table 1 presents a synthetic listing of the main assumptions of the agency theory. When describing the assumptions related to organization, Table 1 mentions a very important problem inseparably connected with the agency theory, namely the "asymmetry of information". As MESJASZ (2000) writes, it arises when one of the entities has certain private information that the other does not possess. In the context of the agency problem, this may occur in the following cases:
-a hidden action taken by the representative; -hidden information or knowledge possessed by the representative. 
Main assumptions:
The principal-agent relations should reflect the effective organization of information flow and the level of costs of the risk taken The unit of analysis :
A contract between the principal and the agent Assumptions concerning attitudes adopted by the contract participants:
Their own benefits Reluctance to risk
Assumptions concerning the organization:
Partial conflict of goals occurring between the participants. Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion Asymmetry of information between the principal and the agent.
Assumptions concerning information:
Information as a good to be obtained
Problems resulting from contracts:
Authority (internal risk, the change in behaviors under the influence of the new appraisal of one's own benefits, reluctance to select) Risk division The range of problems:
Relations within the framework of which the principal and the agent are characterized by different goals and by a partially different attitude to risk (namely: remuneration, leadership, making an impression on the management staff, vertical integration, transfer of costs)
Source: EISENHARDT (1989).
Thus, in both cases we deal with a situation in which the agent, conducting certain actions on behalf of the ordering party, has an information advantage over it. He can manipulate the information or even conceal it in order to realize his own selfish goals. Therefore, systematic monitoring of the representative's behavior is necessary, which in view of the latest research may lead to additional costs for the agency. The controlled managers often compensate the inconvenience resulting from such monitoring by means of excessive remuneration (HOSKISSON, CASTLETON, TITHERS, 2009 ). On the other hand, as the research carried out by EVANS and WEIR (1995) shows, it is true that the reduction of agency costs related to the improper behavior of agents, for example in the scope of the information policy, may be achieved by introducing monitoring, one of the practical manifestations of which may be the systematical arrangement of meetings between the management staff and the owners. However, we should remember that in a situation when such meetings are too frequent (e.g., once a week or more often), the effects may turn out to be contrary to the intended ones.
The use of the agency theory for the analysis of real estate management 3
In accordance with the Real Estate Management Act (REMA), a commune can allocate its real estate among organizational units (and other entities) created by itself, in the form of a permanent administration, tenancy, lease, loan for use 4 , or perpetual usufruct 5 . In addition, the commune may be encumbered with the right of use. In all these cases (even in a situation when, for example, a private person is a perpetual lessee), the commune does not lose its incidents of ownership. On the contrary, the commune bodies have not only a right but also an obligation to control and assess whether the administrator uses the property appropriately (HRYNIEWICZ, 2004 ). An opportunity to analyze the influence occurring between the real estate owner and its actual user from the perspective of the agency theory appears here. A. SADOWSKI'S research (2009) may serve as a Polish example. SADOWSKI discusses the relationships between the owner of agricultural land and its user mainly from the 3 When defining the notion of "real estate management", it is worth referring it to related categories, such as real estate economy and administration which, in Polish realities, are treated separately -see MAŁKOWSKA, MARONA (2012 perspective of the above mentioned agency theory and transaction cost theory. At the same time, he emphasizes the fact that, where social effectiveness is concerned, the key role is played by a properly drawn up contract between the two parties, determining risk sharing, optimum remuneration level and the scope of duties while, at the same time, considering the influence of accidental factors on contract performance. To a great extent, in Polish conditions, this contract will be a derivative of the mandatory law and Civil Code, in particular the REMA.
An additional possibility of analysis from the point of view of the agency theory appears when the management of real estate is commissioned by the commune. In this case, the principal-agent problem and the problem of successful contracting also appear, as well as the necessity to implement a system of supervision in a given unit of local government arising from them. Another example of the use of the agency theory to analyze real estate management can be found in the work of GIBLER and BLACK (2004) , where the authors focus on the analysis of the commissioning model of real estate management, concentrating on studying the risk connected with the principal (entity being the owner of the real estate) -agent (external enterprise providing real estate management services) relation. The authors point out that a necessary condition to reduce the risk connected with the occurrence of the agency relation is the careful familiarization of the agent with the strategy of operations, organizational culture and internal procedures of the service principal. Moreover, it is necessary to exercise supervision over the agent via the implementation of institutional control and permanent monitoring of operations performed on the basis of the management contract.
Managing commune real estate in the commissioning system
The essence of the commissioning system of real estate management consists of entrusting real estate management on the basis of civil-law contracts to private entities (NALEPKA, 2005) . In accordance with the Polish law, such an delegation takes place in compliance with the provisions of the Public Procurement Act, although the administrator is usually selected in open tender proceedings 6 . In this model, a commune formulates the management policy and organizes services which are provided by a private entity. In the described case, three management levels should be distinguished, namely: (1) a commune council, the head of the commune (mayor, city mayor) assisted by the commune office, which performs strategic tasks, (2) a commune organizational unit (e.g., a local government-financed entity) which organizes real estate management, (3) and the selected private entity which performs the management tasks. In this management model, real estate should be treated as capital and the administrator should fulfill certain goals, such as: the maximization of profit from the real estate and an increase in the market value of the real estate. The private entity managing the commune's real property has to align its interest with that of the commune, the users (lessees) and the service providers, as well as choose between a short-term benefit and a long-term value of the real estate (NALEPKA, 2005) .
An advantage of the commissioning system is the lack of conflict of objectives and principles related to the implementation of functions by the commune, with the potential strive for a high effectiveness of the operations performed by private entities, especially when they operate under the conditions of competition (for more about the advantages of the commissioning system see KOLUD'S research (2013)). On the other hand, the necessity to build clear principles of task implementation and an efficient mechanism of controlling the private entity's activities by the commune is a drawback. Apart from its strengths and opportunities, it is also very important to take into consideration the weaknesses and threats of the commissioning system in the decision making process. As TERTELIS (2002, 2003) writes, "some communes which a few years ago decided to tidy the management issue made mistakes, arising, for example, from the lack of proper diligence at the moment of programming the future structure of settlements or planning the tools of supervision over the private administrator of the real estate. Savings obtained while preparing the restructuring contributed to the lack of the expected effects (financial ones, the ones related to the services for the citizens, etc.) and the return of www.versita.com/remv vol. 21, no. 3, 2013 the communes to asset management by its own organizational units." Thus, in order to minimize the risk of the commissioning system suffering a failure, it seems necessary to implement a system of supervision and control over private entities in the commune (within the scope of the performance of the contracts signed with a given unit of the local government). The need for the implementation of effective ownership supervision arises when dealing with the separation of ownership from management. Unfortunately, as practice proves, communes do not use basic supervision tools, such as the possibility to report, audit or control the performance of contracts and the effects of management when applying the commissioning management system (thus, it is an analogous irregularity as in case of the whole real estate management) (MARONA, GŁUSZAK, 2011) . As an example, we can quote the conclusion from the 2008 Supreme Audit Office report (ZARZĄDZANIE NIERUCHOMOŚCIAMI GMINNYMI (KONTROLA KOORDYNOWANA), 2008), according to which the heads of the inspected 33 communes located in nine Polish provinces "did not show due care for an improvement in the effectiveness of managing real estates. Only one of them made analyses of the effects of managing them in the implemented form and the effects possible to be achieved with the use of other forms. Moreover, the supervision of the commune heads over the activities of the managing entities was also insufficientin 18 communes, no such control was conducted at all."
Supervision over commune real estate management contracts
In the commissioning system, the commune bodies enter into contract with other entities when implementing tasks, including, among others: joint stock trade companies and partnerships, associations, state enterprises, chambers of commerce, and other organizations of economic local governments (BYJOCH, REDEŁ, 2000) . The commissioning system is also appearing in the case of managing communal real estate because a licensed administrator may provide services for the owners of every type of a real estate, since the legislation has not established any restrictions within this scope (VADEMECUM ZARZĄDCY NIERUCHOMOŚCI, 2001). As D. OSBORNE and GAEBLER (1992) write, "drawing up contracts and controlling their performance requires a lot of skills. A lot of authorities think that their role ends on signing the contract. As a result, too many private contractors do not meet their obligations or, worse still, recourse to frauds." Therefore, a commune must conduct efficient supervision, focusing on controlling the quality of the services provided by private entities. As J. Stewart writes "where a work is outsourced (…) the local government must ensure that the way in which a given function is performed, fulfills certain requirements. The emphasis is switched from direct service provision to the assurance of its proper quality. Where the local government is not dedicated to managing a given function, it must develop means of monitoring the level of service performance with the emphasis put on the achievement of goals and quality" (ZYNARSKI, 2004) . Therefore, the scope of control should include, in particular, the purposefulness and quality of the conducted overhaul management, the system of managing the real estate finances and the means of collecting rent.
When making a decision about delegating powers related to communal real estate, apart from the factor of the quality of the provided services, the costs of such a contract are also of key significance. It is assumed that is worth considering contracting services (including services related to real estate management) if the total cost of providing such services using one's own resources is at least 10% higher than the total cost of having the service performed by an external entity (ZYNARSKI, 2004) . On the other hand, however, when deciding to assume the commissioning system of management, the commune should also take other criteria into consideration in addition to the two above mentioned factors, including ones of an organizational nature (e.g., the possibility to simplify the organizational structure of the entity).
In the situation of commissioning real estate management by a commune, the commune bodies do not possess very many tools which can be used to supervise a private entity. In the situation of managing real estate by communal companies, the commune may control and, at the same time, influence the functioning of the entity by means of a supervisory board, which is equipped with a number of statutory instruments. In the situation when communal assets are managed by a private entity, the commune may only control whether the contract provisions are observed; however, the system of controlling the services provided by an entity managing the real estate (mainly when quality and price are concerned) cannot be based solely on the information taken from the controlled entity but must also consider external information, to a great extent coming from the opinion of the www.versita.com/remv vol. 21, no. 3, 2013 local community (namely, the stakeholders). Thus, to ensure efficient control, the agreement (contract) takes on special meaning. It should be carefully and precisely structured and include proper warranties, rate formulas, and entitlements of the parties, including the entitlements of the commune to regulate and control the activities of the real estate administrator. According to MALINOWSKI (2000) , every such contract should be concluded in writing and in its content include elements concerning, among others:
-the term; -the kinds of entrusted tasks; -the possibility to use subcontractors' services; -the admissibility of its termination; -the financial conditions. It is worth emphasizing here that in the case of establishing financial conditions with the administrator, there is a possibility of applying an additional supervisory tool in the form of a motivating contracting system, since a portion of the administrators' remuneration should depend, in imitation of market solutions, on the effects of their work (e.g., the recoverability of rents from the communal asset). Such a solution would ensure the minimization of the conflict of interest which always arises when ownership is separated from management. Moreover, as MANNING, RODRIGUEZ and ROULAC (1997) claim, such proceedings not only eliminate the basic agency costs but also create the possibility to integrate the agent's operations with the goals of the principal which has commissioned the management of its assets.
Finally, attention should be drawn to the fact that the relationships which exist between the parties to the agreement, namely the local government unit and the real estate management firm, are a very important aspect in the context of contracting services by a commune. What scope of duties and responsibilities will be passed to the managing entity depends, to a great extent, on the level of trust and the owner's previous experiences (VADEMECUM ZARZĄDCY NIERUCHOMOŚCI, 2001 ).
Conclusion
In the situation when a commune commissions the management of its real estate (as a whole or only a selected fragment) to an external partner, we deal with the separation of ownership from management. When this happens, the commune does not lose the ownership entitlements to its assets; on the contrary, the commune bodies are entitled to implement supervision over the way the assets are managed (for discussion and in-depth analysis in the Polish context see MARONA'S and NALEPKA 'S research (2009) . What this supervision will be like in practice depends on what supervisory tools will be used and to what extent the commune will make decisions regarding the possibility to (i) reduce agency costs, and (ii) minimize risk arising from the representation relation and (iii) the information asymmetry related to it. In accordance with the agency theory, a properly drawn (management) contract has fundamental meaning. It should determine risk sharing, specify a detailed scope of duties between the commune and the managing entity, and simultaneously consider the influence of accidental factors on contract performance and select the optimum, motivating means of establishing remuneration 7 . 7 Big differences can be observed in the way remuneration is calculated both within entities managing real estate and, consequently, the administrators hired by these entities. For example, fixed remuneration for managing firms prevails in Poland, calculated proportionally from the managed real estate area. In the USA, the dependence of remuneration for the managing entity on the amount of gross profit generated by a given real estate is standard, whereas in Germany, there is the practice of providing a set base remuneration and additional remuneration within the framework of the contract. (See: NAJBAR,2011) 
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